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BRINGING LAW AND ORDER TO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES
AND THE GATT/WTO
KIM RUBENSTEIN*
JENNY SCHULTZ**
The Uruguay Round' of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)2 established new dispute settlement procedures to
be enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 These new
procedures represent a two-level move towards a rule of law. On
the first level, the procedures establish general principles that
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** Lecturer in Law, Monash University, Victoria, Australia. LL.M., 1994, University of
Michigan; LL.B., 1990, Monash University; B.A., 1990 Monash University.
1 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Negotia-
tions, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143 (1994) [hereinafter GATT/
WTO]. The adoption of the Uruguay Round of GATT marked the culmination of eight years
of negotiations. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 7 (Terence P.
Stewart ed., 1993). The Uruguay Round Negotiations opened in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
on September 22, 1986. Id. at 1. See generally Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 555, 555 (1996). The Uruguay
Round Agreements cover intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment and trade
in services.
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 35 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT][the GATT also may refer to the institutional
framework which implemented the General Agreement. Hence the distinction between
GATT and GA H'/WTO references]. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 193-94 (1993)
(noting dispute settlement procedures had place at "head" of Uruguay Round agenda); ROB-
ERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 65-111 (2d ed.
1990) (outlining historical development of GATT); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE
GATT SYSTEM 9-35 (1990) (discussing historical role of GATT and examining institutional
and constitutional changes).
3 Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, opened for signature
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter WTO].
"Multilateral Trade Organization" (MTO) was changed to "World Trade Organization"
(WTO) in all Uruguay Round documents. Id. The text of the WTO reads in part that the
parties to the agreement resolve to "develop integrated, more viable and durable multilat-
eral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results
of past trade liberalization efforts, and all the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations ... ." Id. at pmbl. See generally Raymond Vernon, World Trade Organi-
zation: A New Stage in International Trade and Development, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 329, 330
(1995) (discussing recent creation of WTO).
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provide for processes of dispute resolution in a clear, prospective,
and rational manner. On the second level, the process adopts ad-
ministrative law principles significantly clarifying the process of
GATT/WTO disputes. Despite this move towards rule orientation,
however, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures do not
follow a strictly "legal" model. Under a formal legalistic system,4
an adjudicatory body ascertains the relevant law, applies the
facts, weighs selected policy issues, and rules in favor of one of the
disputing parties.5 The parties then implement the adjudicatory
body's decision. Instead, the GATT/WTO legal system is, by its
very nature, a mixture of law and diplomacy,6 primarily because it
actively encourages conciliation, and secondarily because disputes
of law intermesh with the reality of power politics. 7 Such inherent
intermingling is not unique to trade regulation; law can never be
4 We note, of course, that there is no universal definition of a truly legalistic system.
Those who write about the nature and role of international law argue about what features
of the system are necessary to define it as a legal system. See Heather L. Drake, The Im-
pact of the Trade Wars Between the United States and Japan on the Future Success of the
WTO, 3 TULSA J. CoAnP. AND INT'L L. 277, 278 (1996) (defining purpose of WTO as "en-
courag[ing] world economic and political convergence through comprehensive trade policy
surveillance and integrated dispute settlement systems, developmental assistance to less
developed nations and environmental protection"); see also John H. Jackson, Perspectives
on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the
United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1576 (1984) (describing legalistic system as one in-
cluding hearings, statutory criteria, and judicial review; contrasting legalistic system to
system of broad government discretion); cf Benjamin Rozwood & Andrew R. Walker, Note,
Side Agreements, Sidesteps, and Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free Trade in North
America, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 347 n.92 (1993) (stating that legalistic system in some
European Community States permits government regulation).
5 See generally JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERIcAN Jus-
TICE 14-36 (1949) (describing adjudicatory process with formula stating rule combined with
facts equals decision).
6 See William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L. L.J. 427, 446 (1995). In response to the Uruguay Round
Agreements, the Congress authorized the president and the appropriate officers to review
the procedure of the WTO and its potential effect on United States obligations. Id.; see also
Stephen P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 193 (1996). The dispute settle-
ment process "treads on the delicate and confusing issue of national 'sovereignty.'" Id.; Rob-
ert E. Hudec, The GATTLegal System:A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE 615,
665 (1970). In an early article on GATT jurisprudence, Hudec described the GATT legal
system as one "designed and operated as an instrument of diplomacy." Id.
7 See Miguel MontafiA i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolu-
tion of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 108 (1993) (noting
violations are ignored when "parties at fault have sufficient economic or political power
that it is impracticable to obtain compliance"). See generally Frieder Roessler, The Scope,
Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System, in TRADE POLICmS FOR A BETTER FUTURE:
THE LEUTWILER REPORT, "THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND" 71 (1987) (analyzing
GATT/WTO legal system).
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separated from the political environment within which it
operates.8
I. TmE RULE OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This article will examine the GATT/WTO move towards a rule
of law in two senses: first, in the traditional, liberal sense,9 where
the rule of law represents the supreme code of conduct for soci-
ety, 10 and second, as an extension of the first, where the rule of
law subjects the members of society, including the government, to
its principle. 1 ' Administrative law fits into this latter framework
as a representation of the rule of law governing government
action.
In this century, the rule of law has become an important influ-
ence upon the international legal framework, especially in the
8 See Phillip A. Akakwan, The Standard of Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code: Cir-
cumscribing the Role of GATT Panels in Reviewing National Antidumping Determinations,
50 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 277, 296 (1996) (noting that GATT dispute settlement has incor-
porated political factors); see also Mora, supra note 7, at 103, 161 (1993) (noting that "trade
rules that are consistently enforced . . . minimize political conflict"). See generally THE
POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1-9 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (explaining
law is not separate from and "above" politics, economics, culture, and judicial preference).
9 Note the term "liberal legal systems" is a description that is not intended to cover the
legal systems of all WTO members. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential
Treatment in the Law of GATT: Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World
Trading Sustem, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 291, 315 (1988) (noting that "GATT promotes the
principles of... trade liberalism"); see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and Interna-
tional Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829,
836 (1995) (defining "liberalism" in international law context as doctrine wherein nations
seek to promote own interests and thus are essential players in international society);
Loretta F. Smith, The GATT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 919, 933 (1991)
(discussing GATIFs philosophy, which centers on liberalism and "grounds GATT in laissez-
faire economics").
10 See generally M. ALLARs, AUSTRALIAN ADMINmSTRATrVE LAw 14-18 (1990) (providing
extensive discussion of natural justice in Commonwealth common law countries); LoN. L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 157-59 (rev. ed. 1969) (explaining link between rule of law
and liberty); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTInC 235-43 (1971) (same); JOSEPH RAz, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAw: ESSAYS ON LAw AND MORALITY 210-229 (1979) (analyzing relationship
between law and morality and questioning authority of law); Sm WILLIAM WADE AND CHRIS-
TOPHER FoRSYTH, ADMimSTRATiVE LAW 24, 301, 737 (7th ed. 1994) (comparing United
States and Parliamentary systems).
"The rule of law" is also discussed in more general terms, as a set of principles that
underpin the legal system. Basic notions of justice, equality before the law, legal entitle-
ment, and the rationality of law underlie the notion. The principles include prospective,
clear, and open legal norms that are fairly stable and that embody rules capable of being
followed. In terms of general principles and administrative law principles, the rule of law
provides a framework to guide individuals and government. The academic discussion of
"the rule of law" is extensive.
11 See generally A.V. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 114 (Liberty Classics 1982) (8th ed. 1915) (discussing nature and application of rule of
law).
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area of trade regulation. 12 As a result, international administra-
tive law principles often influence the rules that govern interna-
tional law organizations, such as the United Nations or the
WTO. 13 These rules govern the way such organizations interact
with employees and fulfill legal obligations.' 4
Throughout the world, international administrative law also in-
cludes an emerging jurisprudence of common administrative law
principles. 5 Some difficulties arise associated with the desire to
identify these general principles, however, especially because ad-
ministrative law is directly linked to the governmental system of
individual countries.1 6 For instance, the strong separation of pow-
ers principle in the United States system of government has influ-
enced America's principles of administrative law,"v whereas, the
12 See George M. Berrisch, The Establishment of New Law Through Subsequent Practice
in GATT, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. AND Comm. REG., 497, 500 (1991) (declaring that Uruguay
Round Agreements strengthen "GATr System governed by rule of law"); see also Mora,
supra note 7, at 109 (offering a discussion of different philosophies towards GAIT law);
Louis B. Sohn et al., WORKING GRouP ON IMPROVING THE EFFEcTIvENEss OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, Report on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations in Advancing the
Rule of law in the World, 29 INT'L LAW. 293,294 (1995) (providing discussions of rule of law
in international law context).
13 See Daniel G. Partan, Note, International Administrative Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 639,
639 (1981) (explaining national officials often look to United Nations agencies for rules and
standards to guide their work); see also Shell, supra note 9, at 923 n.406 (analogizing
WTO's rulemaking processes to litigation processes in United States administrative law).
14 See generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, 1 THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE
257-402 (2d rev. ed. 1994) (discussing decisions of international administrative tribunals
on myriad of legal issues arising between international organizations and their staff mem-
bers); DoCUMENTs OF INTERNATIONAL ADMNISTRATIVE TRIBuNALs 1-4 (C.F. Amerasinghe
ed., 1989) (presenting collection of documents on international administrative tribunals).
15 See LAWRENCE BAXTER, ADMnIsTRATrvE LAW 36 (1984) (discussing how general princi-
ples of administrative law have now gained international currency). See generally H.B.
JACOBIm, AN INTRODUCTION TO CoMPARATIVE ADMInSTRATIVE LAW 1-22 (1991) (comparing
American Administrative law with procedure in other countries and cultures); JVRGEN
SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINisTRAT1vE LAW 3-10 (1992) (tracing origins and development of
corpus of European Administrative law).
16 See SCHWARzE, supra note 15, at 87-88 (discussing link between administrative law
and governmental systems in European Community); see also Timothy M. Reif, Coming of
Age in Geneva: Guiding the GATT Dispute Settlement System on Review of Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Proceeding, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1185, 1185-89 (1993) (not-
ing difficulty in applying international law to matters of governmental administrative law).
But see Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review,
and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 199 (1996) (recalling that
some government representatives believed U.S. administrative law jurisprudence provided
useful model for GATT standard of review).
17 See Pieter M. Scherklan, When and How Should Texas Courts Review Agency Rules?,
47 BAYLOR L. REV. 989, 1025 (1995). The courts "have long been sympathetic.., to separa-
tion of powers concerns about administrative agencies." Id.; see also Paul R. Verkuil, Sepa-
ration of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
301, 325 (1989). "Congress can and does restrict presidential control of administrative offi-
cials." Id.; Timothy E. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regu-
latory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model
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parliamentary system utilized by many Commonwealth countries
likewise has molded the administrative law principles of those na-
tions.1 8 Remarkably, despite these differences in government
structure, many similar principles exist. 19
Administrative law is the context within which domestic trade
regulation often occurs.2 ° It fits comfortably within an analysis of
the move towards the rule of law in the GATT/WTO dispute reso-
lution system.2 ' Some of the administrative law principles that
comprise the domestic context will be examined in the context of
the GATT/WT0 22 where they guide the move towards a rule of
law. 23
for the Congress Agency Relationship, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 479, 526 (1995). There is a
"traditional separation-of-powers-rooted thinking in administrative law." Id.
18 See Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Com-
mitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 L.J. EcON. & ORG.
201, 206 (1994) (noting in parliamentary system where executive has strong legislative
powers, administrative law will not constrain the executive); see also William A. Tilleman,
Environmental Appeals Board: A Comparative Look at the United States, Canada, and
England, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 99 (1996) (explaining that parliamentary systems are
based on ministerial accountability).
19 Note that many of the present signatories have western democratic systems of govern-
ment, so their administrative law principles will often reflect similar principles. With pro-
spective WTO members such as China, the similarities may be reduced. See generally
WADE & FoRsYTH, supra note 10, at 996-98 (comparing United States and Parliamentary
systems).
20 See J. Michael Finger, The Meaning of "Unfair" in United States Trade Policy, 1 MINN
J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 44 (1992) (noting that legal remedies in antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases depend primarily "on administrators' understanding of laws' objectives");
see also Craig R. Giesze, Mexico's New Antidumping and Countervailing Duty System: Pol-
icy and Legal Implications, as Well as Practical Business Risks and Realities for United
States Exporters to Mexico in the ERA of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 25 ST.
MARY's L.J. 885, 929 (1994) (noting Mexican promulgation of administrative regulations
which governed unfair international trade practices).
21 See Shell, supra note 9, at 833-34 (explaining that under legalist theory of interna-
tional trade dispute resolution creation of rule-based trade tribunals can move world trade
toward a governance system based on "the rule of law").
22 See infra part IV (examining principles in detail). These principles are due process/
natural justice, timeliness and exhaustion, standing, transparency, judicial review, and
remedies. See generally Victoria Curzon, New Institutional Developments in GATT, 1 MNN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 89 (1992) (providing interview of new dispute settlement procedure,
including improved transparency).
23 This approach mirrors an approach in a paper prepared by Kim Rubenstein for the
International Trade Regulation Committee of the Administrative law section of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. Kim Rubenstein, Administrative Law Principles and the GATT (De-
cember 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The report looked at adminis-
trative law principles in some GATT member jurisdictions. Id. Those surveyed were:
Australia, Canada, European Community, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden. Id.
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II. GATT - RULE OR POLITICALLY ORIENTATED?
Historically, an unsettled aspect of the GATT has been its dis-
pute-resolution role.24 The GATT panel adjudicatory process
originated amid suggestions that it should be based on a political/
conciliatory model, rather than a legalistic/adjudicatory model of
panel review.25 The political/conciliatory view of the GATT lacked
singular focus. 26 One draftsperson of the GATT, at the prepara-
tory meetings, stated that the Agreement "should deal with these
subjects in precise detail so that the obligations of member gov-
ernments would be clear and unambiguous."2 7
Moreover, the drafters originally intended to place the GATT in
the setting of the International Trade Organization (ITO). Conse-
quently, the charter required a dispute-settlement procedure fo-
24 The following article provides several perspectives on GATT within the context of dis-
pute resolution in international trade. See Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of
United States Trade Law, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 141 (1992) (concluding GATT legal
'system has provided one of most successful and effective international trade dispute reso-
lution systems in history of international relations"); see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institu-
tional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade - Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1043, 1063 (1994) (characterizing GATT as lacking "well-developed mechanism for resolv-
ing disputes between the Contracting Parties"); John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of
International Trade Institutions, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 11, 19 (1992) (stating that GATT
dispute settlement processes have had some recent success but still pose important
problems that need to be addressed); Mora, supra note 7, at 106 (asserting that new dis-
pute-settlement procedures implemented after Uruguay Round will add certainty, predict-
ability, and fairness to international trading system).
25 See OLIVIER LONG, LAw AND ITS LIMrrATIONS IN THE GATT MuLTIATERAL TRADE Sys-
TEM 5 (1987) (describing GATT as "a legal framework for the conduct of trade relations
between its member countries, a forum for trade negotiations and for the adaptation of its
legal framework, and an organ for conciliation and settlement of disputes"); see also Mora,
supra note 7, at 75 (noting that prior to Uruguay Round, GATT panels were conciliatory
bodies rather than courts); Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of
International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 578, 592 (1991)
(stating that "GATT dispute settlement mechanism incorporates variants of conciliation
throughout process").
26 The United States is generally perceived to have supported the legalistic position,
while Japan and the European Community have been considered supporters of the polit-
ical/conciliatory view. Most developing countries and non- European countries have tended
to support the legalistic position because they regard such an approach as a more effective
protector of small country rights. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET. AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 332-59 (3rd ed. 1995) (discussing dispute resolution sanc-
tions in GATT); see also Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Law-
yers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw. 389, 389 (1995) (explaining that some
countries, particularly members of European Union, historically preferred more diplomatic
approach to GATT dispute resolution, while other countries, such as United States, pre-
ferred adjudicatory approach).
27 JOHN H. JACKSON, THm WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 93 (1989) (quoting United States representative Harry Hawkins,
speaking at London meeting of Preparatory Committee of United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment).
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cused on the effective use of arbitration.28 Furthermore, the shift
in the GATT dispute resolution procedures, from a committee or
"working party" procedure to a "panel procedure," confirmed that
the practice had evolved into a legalistic/adjudicatory model from
an exclusively political/conciliatory model.29
III. RULE OF LAW PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
DISPUTES-POST URUGUAY3 °
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
28 The fact that the International Trade Organization was not adopted may support the
political/conciliatory theory in that the failure to adopt that framework is an implicit rejec-
tion of the legalistic/adjudicatory model. See generally KENNETH W. DAm, ThE GATT: LAw
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 3-8 (1970) (criticizing legalistic approach in
GATT and ITO). But see JACKSON, supra note 27, at 32-34. Jackson argues, however, that
the failure to adopt the ITO is not reflective of that sentiment, but was related to other
factors. Id.
29 See Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving To-
wards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 38 (1990) (providing discussion of the gradual trend
of the GATT dispute settlement processes toward legalism); see also Miguel Montafth i
Mora, International Law and International Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International
Law/International Relations Perspective on the U.S. IEC Agricultural Export Subsidies
Dispute, 19 N.C. J. INT'L & Comm. REG. 1, 19 (1993) (noting since creation of panels in 1952
GATT has shifted to more legalistic approach); Young, supra note 26, at 393 (describing
1952 transformation of conciliatory working parties into more adjudicatory panels).
30 Initially the GATT was not legalistic at all as it only had a few paragraphs devoted to
dispute resolution and those paragraphs did not mention adjudication by panels. See
generally JACKSON, supra note 27, at 94. Procedures for dispute resolution were weak. Id.
The central and formal procedures were found in Articles XXII and XXIII. Id. Article XXII,
entitled "Consultation," encouraged the member states involved in the dispute
(Contracting Parties) to consult with one another about any matter affecting the operation
of the Agreement. Id. If this did not solve the problem, Article XXIII provided for the
lodging of written complaints with the offending party. Id. Originally, these complaints
were first referred to "working parties" consisting of representatives from member state
delegations, including those of the disputing countries. Id. at 95. However this primitive
conflict resolution practice was short-lived. Id. The introduction of the panel proceeding
was the first sign of a move towards an adjudicative model of conflict resolution. Id. Upon
the introduction of panels, procedures became more judicial in appearance. Id. Disputants
were no longer part of the decision-making body, but more like normal litigants. Id. The
panel took on the visage of an arbiter and panels began to separate the evidentiary stage,
where the parties had a right to be heard, from the decision making stage, where the panel
deliberated in private. Id.
Articles XXII and XXIII did not set out any procedures for the panel process, these
developed over time through common practice. Id. The Panel hearing was conducted in a
manner that is typical of adversarial judicial tribunals. Id. The disputants, having agreed
upon the terms of reference, were generally able to determine the crux of the dispute. Id. If
a settlement was effected, the Panel prepared a report limited to a brief outline of the
dispute. Id. If settlement did not occur, the Panel generally prepared and submitted to the
parties the descriptive part of its report in an attempt to give the disputants another
opportunity to seek an amicable settlement. Id. In due course, the report was presented to
the Contracting Parties who then decided whether to adopt it. Id. Contracting Parties were
under no compulsion to adopt the panels determination. Id. Most were adopted, however,
while some were only noted or otherwise not explicitly approved. Id. In strict legal terms, it
was only the decision of the Contracting Parties that was relevant under Art. XXIII. Id.
The decision to adopt needed to be made unanimously by the Contracting Parties. Id.
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tlement of Disputes ("DSU"),31 titled Annex 2, outlines the new
dispute settlement rules of the GATT/WTO system. The Uruguay
Round system of dispute settlement is tied to the WTO, and was
inaugurated on January 1, 1995.32 The Annexes to the Agreement
Establishing the WT0 31 contain the Agreements negotiated dur-
ing the Uruguay Round. The DSU covers the negotiations and the
Agreements (Covered Agreements) 34 that are part of its Annex 1;
the DSU itself is titled Annex 2.
The DSU strengthens the rule-orientated, legalistic character of
the dispute settlement mechanism in a number of ways. The DSU
creates the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 36 an oversight body,
to administer dispute procedures. Additionally, the DSU sets
strict timetables for each stage of the proceedings, introduces au-
tomatic adoption of panel reports and, most significantly, estab-
lishes an appellate system.37 In contrast, the DSU affords the con-
ciliatory approach less weight.38
31 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
33 I.L.M. 112, 114 (1993) [hereinafter DSU] (noting GATT rules and procedures were codi-
fied by DSU reached in Tokyo Round); see also Young, supra note 26, at 391-96 (providing
historical perspective on dispute resolution in GATT).
32 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1125 (noting acceptance of the WTO agreement).
33 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1154 (indicating that rules and procedures are
located in Annex to Agreement).
34 See DSU app. 1, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1244 (defining "Agreements Covered by
the Understanding" as term used in DSU to describe Agreements under its ambit).
3 See DSU part II art. II, 3, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1144. The Agreements con-
tained in Annex 4 to the Treaty establishing the WTO (the Plurilateral Trade Agreements)
are not automatically covered by the DSU. Id. The parties to each of these Agreements
must adopt a decision to that effect, which decision may include special rules or derogations
from the DSU. Id. The Agreements concerned are the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,
the Agreement on Government Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement and the
International Bovine Meat Agreement. Id. Part II, ann. 4(a)-(d).
36 See DSU, part II, art. IV, $ 3, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1145. Pursuant to Article III
of the WTO Agreement, the WTO administers the DSU. Id. at 1145. If the WTO Council
meets in relation to dispute settlement its name changes to Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). Id. The DSB will inherit most of the functions that were exercised up until this
point by the Contracting Parties. Id. The Contracting Parties will be renamed Members of
the WTO. Id. at 1144
37 See Akakwan, supra note 8, at 285 (describing general success of Uruguay Round
which included establishment of dispute settlement body); see also Thomas J. Dillon, The
World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349,
375-76 (1995) (describing function and effect of DSU within new dispute resolution mecha-
nism of WTO); Shell, supra note 9, at 849 (providing overview of dispute resolution system,
including role of DSB).
38 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 ILM at 1242. Only Articles 4 and 5 order consultation and
mediation, and a footnote to Article 4:11 lists the consultation provisions in various WTO
Agreements. Id.; see also Timothy A. Harr, WTO Dispute Settlement Provisions, 722 PLI/
Comm 579, 639 (1995). The use of Articles 4 and 5 "is by mutual consent of the parties and
either party may terminate at any time." Id.; Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General
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The DSU still encourages arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute settlement.3 9 While there appears to be a significant shift
towards judicialization of procedure, the conciliatory approach re-
mains the initial step in settling disputes under the DSU.4 °
Although the conciliatory approach may continue throughout
the course of panel proceedings, 4 the DSU provides for both con-
ciliation and adjudication as dispute settlement methods under
the WTO.4 2 However, the DSU stresses a rule-orientated function
over a political/conciliatory function.43
The comprehensive procedural rules in the DSU evidence the
shift from the conciliatory approach towards a rule of law.44 The
procedural rules, in addition to answering all substantial proce-
dural questions, also seek to balance any disparity of power be-
tween countries. 45 The DSU's advanced system of procedural rules
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 155, 195 (1996). The "idea of
conciliation has remained part of... the ideal of dispute resolution under GATT." Id.
39 See DSU, art. 25, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1242. See generally Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement System: On the Use of Arbitra-
tion in GATT, in TiE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 323 (discussing role of arbitration in GATT).
40 See Dillon, supra note 37, at 381-82 (examining in detail provisions of Articles 4 and
5). The procedures for consultations in Article 4 remain a first step in the dispute settle-
ment process. Id. The procedures for good offices, conciliation, and mediation in Article 5
are voluntary options if the parties agree. Id.
41 See DSU, part II, art. 5, para. 5, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 1125-30 (noting Article 5
allows conciliation proceedings to continue parallel with the panel proceedings); see also
Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J.
INT'L ARB. 53, 56-92 (1987) (providing former GATT official's view of panel procedure).
42 See Dillon, supra note 37, at 375-90 (describing dispute settlement under auspices of
WTO); see also Reif, supra note 25, at 633 (discussing benefits of conciliatory system versus
adjudication of disputes); Eric A. Schwartz, The Resolution of International Commercial
Disputes Under the Auspices of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, 18 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 719, 735 (1995) (describing ICC system for resolution of disputes by
conciliation as well as adjudication).
43 See infra notes 54-73 and accompanying text (describing procedural rules mandated
by DSU).
44 See Dillon, supra note 37, at 392. The author summarizes several significant proce-
dural rules affecting obligations between GATT contracting parties, including creation of
"unified" dispute resolution system and establishment of Appellate Body to review legal
issues decided by panels. Id.
45 See James R. Holbein & Gary Carpenter, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 531, 537 (1993) (ana-
lyzing DSU's standardized procedures for dispute resolution as "improvements"); see also
Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in
Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 204 (1995) (outlining develop-
ment of DSU's new procedures for dispute resolution). See generally Richard 0. Cunning-
ham, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Did We Get What the United States, or Did We Give
Up the Only Remedy That Really Worked?, at 547, 576 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 722, 1995) (discussing procedural effect of rules in Gatt, WTO
and Uruguay Round Agreement Act). The DSU improves the old system of dispute settle-
ment. Id. Its provisions guarantee: a right to a panel; the adoption of panel reports absent
consensus to reject the report; appellate review of legal aspects of reports; and time limits
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includes provisions governing procedures for filing a complaint,4"
timeframes for the dispute-settlement process, 47 urgent applica-
tions,48 provisions for the joinder of third parties,4 9 frameworks
structuring the panel process,50 time limitations for reaching a de-
cision, 51 parties' rights to appeal,52 and the enforcement of judg-
ments.53 These new procedural rules reflect "rule of law" general
principles, some of which are explained below.
A. Time-frames: Certainty in Process
Prior to the Uruguay Round, it was obvious to most observers
that the established dispute-settlement procedures were ineffec-
tive. 54 For example, members could delay or block the process be-
cause every aspect of the process, including the selection of panel-
ists and the adoption of final reports, was decided by consensus.55
During the Tokyo Round, drafters addressed some of the earlier
problems, outlining procedures in the 1979 Understanding on Dis-
pute Settlement.5 6 Drafters adopted additional procedures in the
1982 Ministerial meeting. Additionally, during the mid-term re-
governing when members must bring their laws into conformity, with concomitant authori-
zation to retaliate if a member has not implemented a panel's ruling within the prescribed
time. Id.
46 See DSU art 9, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 116-21. Article 9 sets forth the procedures
for multiple complaints. Id.
47 Id. at 121.
48 Id. at 121.
49 Id. at 120.
50 DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 117-18.
51 Id. at 125.
52 Id. at 123-24.
53 Id. at 125-26 (providing procedure for "Surveillance of Implementation of Recommen-
dations and Rulings"). See generally id. at 373-81 (providing detailed explanation of DSU's
dispute resolution system).54 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade
Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31
COMMON Mcr. L. REv. 1157, 1203 (1994) (explaining that prior to completion of Uruguay
Round there existed increasing concerns regarding several aspects of GATT dispute settle-
ment system); see also, Nicole Telecki, The Role of Special 301 in the Development of Inter-
national Protection of Intellectual Property Rights After the Uruguay Round, 14 B.U. Irr'L
L.J. 187, 193 (1996) (explaining that before Uruguay Round, GATT only covered trade in
goods and provided no protection for intellectual property). See generally John J. Barcelo
III, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment-The GATT Uruguay Round San-
itary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755, 756 (1994) (discussing new
GATT rules and possible environmental threat).
55 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade Environment
Disputes, 15 MICH. J. IN7'L L. 1043, 1063 (1994) (noting flaws of GATT with respect to
adoption of reports within context of trade-environment conflicts).
56 See Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXII, B.I.S.D. 11S/95, 15 (1962) (later codified in
Tokyo Round, 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement, B.I.S.D. 26S/216, Annex, para.
5) (creating nullification or impairment).
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view of the Uruguay Round, more changes were introduced on a
trial basis.57 Most of the consultation phase of this regime, which
was valid until the end of the Uruguay Round, has been incorpo-
rated in the 1994 DSU. The DSU, however, introduced a number
of changes to the Montreal interim agreement. 58
Notable features of the 1994 DSU are the introduction of sev-
eral deadlines for establishing panels5 9 deliberating cases,6 0 and
the adoption 6 1 and implementation 62 of reports.
The right to a panel proceeding at the expiration of a specified
consultation period is an important initiative.61 Currently, de-
lays, blocking, and other tactical methods to forestall the estab-
lishment of adjudicative panels are unlikely. 4 Under the new
rules, if no mutually satisfactory result is reached following initial
conciliatory efforts, either party may request a panel proceeding.6 5
The conciliation process is, thus, the beginning of the adjudicatory
process.66
57 See 1989 Dispute Settlement Procedures Improvements, B.I.S.D. 36S/61 (1990). The
Montreal Interim Agreement was adopted Dec. 1988 [hereinafter 1989 Improvements].
58 See generally Spencer W. Waller, The Uruguay Round and the Future of World Trade,
18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1992) (discussing 1988 midterm meeting in Montreal as produc-
ing only few tangible results).
59 See DSU arts. 5, 8, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 117-19 (outlining proceeding involving
good offices conciliation and mediation taken by parties to dispute).
60 Id. art. 12, at 120-21 (outlining panel working procedures for determining timetable
for panel discussions).
61 See id. at 122-23 (outlining procedure for adoption of panel reports).
62 See id. at 125-26 (outlining procedure for surveillance of implementation of recom-
mendation and ruling).
63 DSU art. 4.7, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 117 (outlining remedy available to com-
plaining party).
64 See, e.g., Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wine and
Alcoholic Beverages, B.I.S.D. 345/83, 115, para. 5.6 (adopted on Nov. 10, 1987). In 1985, the
European Community requested a consultation with Japan in line with GATT article
XXII:1. Id. The European Community asked Japan to eliminate import restrictions on al-
cohol and alcoholic beverages. After two rounds of consultations the European Community
considered them a failure and requested that a panel be set up in line with GATT Article
XXIII:2. Id. But Japan opposed the establishment of the panel on the ground that the Arti-
cle XXII:1 consultations had not been exhausted. Id.; see also Erwin P. Eichmann, Proce-
dural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving Towards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus.
L. 38, 77 (1990) (noting GATIs move toward legalism prevents blocking of dispute panel
decisions); SCHWARZE, supra note 15, at 962 (discussing panel process delaying tactics em-
ployed by European Community in its disputes with the United States in 1972).
65 See DSU art. 4.7, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 117 (discussing procedure for requesting
panel proceeding).
66 See id, at 115-17 (recommending that all GATT members engage in good faith concili-
ation to resolve disputes).
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Since the DSU sets a strict time limit for the completion of con-
ciliation and litigation,67 the DSU establishes a close link between
conciliation and adjudication. Strict time frames propel the dis-
pute settlement procedures towards a more legalistic approach,
creating a streamlined and strengthened system.6 8 Calibrated
progression of disputes through different time-limited stages min-
imizes the effective use of delay tactics utilized in past GATT dis-
pute settlements. As a result, the new process is more certain and
efficient.
The move toward rule of law principles is not absolute. The re-
spect shown by parties for these deadlines likely will depend on
brute politics, the identity of the parties, and the power of the
countries as parties. 69 There also exist non-political factors such
as the complexity of the dispute. Thus, whether the deadlines will
operate effectively within the WTO dispute-settlement framework
remains unclear.7 °
67 See GATT/WTO, supra note 1, at $ 4. Under GATT Article XXIII:2, parties were only
required to finalize conciliation within a reasonable time and the 1979 Understanding
merely required the parties to conclude consultation expeditiously. Id. These vague provi-
sions provided the contracting parties with an opportunity to delay or even to block the
establishment of a panel. Id. But see DSU, art. 4:7, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 117 (laying
down set timetable for consultation and conciliation and providing that, when specific time
expires, parties concerned have right to resort to panel); Jack J. Chen, Going Bananas:
How the WTO Can Heal the Goal Banana Trade Dispute, 63 FoRDHAM L. R.v. 1283, 1331
(1995) (stating that strict time limits of WTO dispute procedure eliminate ability of mem-
bers to prolong and postpone dispute resolution process).
68 See DSU arts. 20, 21, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 125-26. Articles 20 and 21 dictate
specific timeframes for DSB decisions. Id. In addition, prompt compliance with rulings or
recommendations of the DSB is considered essential to ensure the effective resolution of
disputes between parties. Id.
69 See generally Cunningham, supra note 45, at 562 (proposing that not all or even most
U.S. efforts to eliminate GAIT-violative foreign practices will be resolved by adjudicated
WTO decision).
70 Editorial Note: Since the substantive writing of this article, the WTO DSB has deliv-
ered its first Panel decision and Appellate Body decision. See World Trade Organization,
Doc. No. WT/DS 2/R, reprinted in World Trade Organization: Report of the Panel in United
States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline and Like Products of Na-
tional Origin, Jan. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 274, 274-300 (containing Panel Report of United
States gasoline dispute); see also World Trade Organization Doc. No. WT/DS2/AB/R, re-
printed in World Trade Organization Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, May 20, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 603, 603-34 (containing Appellate Body Report of United States gasoline dispute).
See generally Jennifer Schultz, The Demise of "Green" Protectionism: The WTO Decision on
the US Gasoline Rule, DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 1996) (providing full discus-
sion of United States Gasoline dispute). In this instance the deadlines laid down by the
DSU were effectively complied with by the parties. Id.
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In certain situations, the DSB may act upon the lapse of a dead-
line and bar the complaining party's non-agreement.7 1 In such
cases, the DSB may authorize retaliatory measures or refuse to
follow the DSU's decision.7 2 The DSB's ability to ignore the DSU
brings into question the credibility of the system involved and il-
lustrates the intermeshing of political and legal factors.73
B. Adoption of Panel Reports
The most serious breakdown in early GATT dispute resolution
was the failure to adopt certain contentious reports. Due to the
consensus method of decision making, the losing party could block
the adoption of a panel report at the Council level. The new rules
were designed to overcome this problem. The DSU significantly
changes the old procedure, adopting an approach emphasizing the
rule of law.74 For instance, Article 16.4 requires automatic adop-
tion of reports unless there is a consensus among the parties
against adoption.75 This important change makes clear the conse-
quences of a Panel decision. Regarding the adoption of Appellate
reports, Article 17.4 recapitulates Article 16.4.76
Abandonment of the consensus approach illustrates a marked
"legalization" and "judicialization" of the dispute settlement pro-
71 See DSU art. 20, 21, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 125-26. Article 20 entitled "Time-
Frame for DSB Decisions" and Article 21 entitled "Surveillance of Implementation of Rec-
ommendations and Rulings" provides for specific time frames for arbitration between par-
ties with additional time being within the discretion of the DSB. Id. The emphasis on
prompt resolution is reflected in the creation of a fourteen month timetable for DSU pro-
ceedings. Id.
72 See id. at 126-28. Article 22, entitled "Compensation and Suspension of Concessions"
provides that compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations are tempo-
rary measures available in event that recommendation and Rulings are not implemented
within reasonable period of time. Id.
73 See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 34-38 (discussing legal and political factors in DSB's
power to ignore DSU); see also WADE & FoRsYrH, supra note 10, at 970-75 (explaining
rationality of law underlying basic notions of justice that underpin legal system).
74 See DSU art. 16.4, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 123. Article 16.4 provides that the
report shall be adopted by the DSB meeting unless one of the parties to the dispute for-
mally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the report. Id.; see also Reif, supra note 25, at 593. Although the author argues that
GATT conveys a non-legalistic attitude, she indicates that the reports of the panel virtually
always are founded on GATr treaty law and do not consider non-judicial elements. Id.
75 See DSU art. 16.4, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 122-23 (noting adoption of panel report
by members within 60 days of issuance DSB decides by consensus not to adopt report).
76 See DSU art. 17.14, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 123. According to Article 17.4, "an
Appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties
to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate report." Id.
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cess. 77 Automatic adoption of panel reports may enhance their in-
fluence, as panels need no longer formulate reports with fear that
the losing party will block adoption. 78 As welcome as this improve-
ment may be, questions of efficacy still shadow the new provisions.
Will the United States and the European Community, for exam-
ple, accept panel reports condemning their domestic policies? 79
While members can no longer block the adoption of panel reports,
they can decide not to implement decisions into their domestic
arenas. Such a situation has the potential to occur in the United
States due to legislation implementing the Uruguay Round
Agreements. °
77 See Chen, supra note 67, at 1330. The author concludes that the rule implementing
adoption of an Appellate Body report unless decided by consensus not to be adopted, cre-
ates a dramatic shift toward legalism. Id.
78 See id. at 1330 (noting approval of automatic adoption of DSB panel reports).
79 See id. at 1332-33. The United States, Japan, and other members of the European
Community must adapt to the strict guidelines of the WTO so that the world does not
revert back to the ineffective earlier GATT system. Id. The European Community and the
United States have previously blocked the adoption of panel reports which they found un-
palatable; see also Banana case DS 38/R of 11 February 1994 (not adopted by European
Community); Airbus case SCM142 of 4 March 1992 (also not adopted by European Commu-
nity); infamous Tuna/Dolphin case DS21/R of 3 September 1991 (not adopted by United
States).
80 See Dole Bill, S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). It would appear that the intro-
duction of the Dole Bill counters the perceived trend by the United States towards promo-
tion and acceptance of an international rule of law. See also Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Negotiations, opened for signature Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1142 (1994). In an Agreement between the U.S. Administration and
Senator Robert Dole provisions were made which may force the United States to leave the
WTO if too many adverse decisions are adopted against it. The Agreement set up a WTO
Dispute Settlement Review Commission which will review all final WTO dispute settle-
ment reports adverse to the United States, to determine whether the panel exceeded its
authority or acted outside the scope of the Agreement. In this Agreement the following text
was adopted:
The Administration will support legislation next year to establish a WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Review Commission .... It will review all final WTO dispute settlement re-
ports, adverse to the United States, to determine whether the panel exceeded its au-
thority or acted outside the scope of the Agreement. Following issuance of any
affirmative determination by the Commission, any member of each House would be
able to introduce a joint resolution calling on the President to negotiate new dispute
settlement rules that would address and correct the problem identified by the Commis-
sion. If there are three affirmative determinations in any five year period, any member
of each House may introduce a joint resolution to disapprove United States participa-
tion in the WTO - and if the resolution is enacted by Congress and signed by the Presi-
dent, the United States would commence withdrawal from the WTO Agreement. Our
goals here are straightforward: (1) to assure that the dispute settlement process is
accountable; (2) that it is a fair process; and (3) that it works as we expect it to work.
From the Administration's standpoint, we are confident that the dispute settlement
process will work fairly and that the concerns expressed by many will not materialize.
However, if panels do exceed their authority, this proposal gives us a fail-safe device.
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There exists a definite move to a legalistic, rule of law orienta-
tion in the GATT/WTO. While not denying that conciliation and
political forces still play a vital role, the placing of those forces and
administrative law principles within a clearly legal framework
has changed the nature of the contest.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Due Process/Natural Justice8 l
Principles of due process and natural justice are found in many
countries' administrative law systems;82 those principles being
procedural in nature.8 3 The need for a fair decision making pro-
cess is of fundamental importance for rule of law inspired sys-
tems. The exact form of the process varies between countries, but
one can identify some common, general principles.
Natural justice in Commonwealth common law countries8 4 con-
sists of two principles. First, under the hearing rule, based on the
maxim audi alteram partem,5 the decision-maker must give peo-
ple affected by the decision an opportunity to be heard. Second,
the bias rule, based on the maxim nemo debet esse judex in pro-
poria sua causa,8 6 requires the decision maker to be disinterested
or unbiased in the matter to be decided.8 7 The concept of due pro-
cess in United States administrative law covers similar princi-
81 The term "due process" is used in the United States, whereas, in Commonwealth
common law countries the same principles are discussed as natural justice. In Australia,
the term procedural fairness is also used.
82 See Rubenstein, supra note 23 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discuss-
ing administrative law principles in GATT member countries).
83 See generally PETER L. STRAuss, AN INTRODUCTION To ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE
UNrrED STATES 48-49 (1989) (providing general discussion of due process). Note that in the
United States, due process principles are also relevant in the constitutional context in de-
ciding whether legislation is constitutional. This is referred to as "substantive due process."
84 England, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are examples.
85 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 158 (6th ed. 1990) (defining as "[hlear the other side;
hear both sides. No man should be condemned unheard.").
86 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1037 (6th ed. 1990) (defining maxim as one derived from
civil law: "No man ought to be a judge in his own cause").
87 See generally WADE & FoRsYTH, supra note 10, at 465-72 (comparing United States
and Parliamentary systems); ALLARs supra note 10, at 236-74 (providing extensive discus-
sion of these principles).
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ples.8 8 The due process concept also is consistent with many Euro-
pean administrative law systems. 9
1. Hearing
Whether a person is entitled to representation at a hearing dif-
fers among countries and may depend on the context of each case.
As a rule, however, the right to respond to allegations, is the stan-
dard link to most administrative law principles.
GATT/WTO panels have numerous features that reflect fair
hearing principles. To ensure a fair hearing, the GATT/WTO
panels require that the decision maker be disinterested in the out-
come. In addition, the semblance of authority is important. Con-
sequently, the DSU requires that panels be staffed with well-qual-
ified individuals.90
The administrative law principle of a fair hearing is evidenced
in various panel practices. Paragraph 18 of the DSU forbids ex
parte communications with the panel or with the Appellate Body
in pending matters.9 1 Written submissions to the panel or to the
Appellate Body must be made available to all parties involved in
the dispute.92 Appendix 3 also provides for a fair hearing.9 3 Each
disputant makes written and oral arguments to which the oppo-
nent may respond. 4 Confidentiality issues are dealt with in this
88 See generally STRAuss, supra note 83, at 32-48 (noting complicated history to develop-
ment of elements due).
89 See generally SCHWARZE, supra note 15, at 1173-430 (describing principles of adminis-
trative procedure within European Community).
90 See DSU para. 8.1, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 118. According to paragraph 8.1:
Well qualified governmental and or non governmental individuals, including persons
who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a
Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or
Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secreta-
riat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior
trade policy official of a Member.
Id.
91 Id. para 18, at 124. Paragraph 18, entitled "Communications with the Panel or Appel-
late Body," forbids ex parte communications with the panel or appellate boy concerning
matters under consideration by the panel or appellate body.
92 DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 124.
93 See id. at 132-33 (setting forth working procedures to be followed by dispute settle-
ment panel).
94 Id, at 133. Paragraph 10 states:
[In the interest of full transparency, the presentations, rebuttals and statements re-
ferred to in paragraphs 5 and 9 shall be made in the presence of the parties. Moreover,
each party's written submissions, including any comments on the descriptive part of
the report and responses to questions put by the panel, shall be made available to the
other party or parties.
Id.
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context.9 5 Panel members, usually trade diplomats, must not dis-
cuss issues with the disputants' representatives outside panel
meetings. Pursuant to the working procedures set out in the
DSU, panel members must keep all information confidential.9 6
2. Independence of Panel Members
The DSU provides that the selection process of panel members
should ensure the independence of those members. 97 Panel mem-
bers, however, historically have been government officials from
other countries. This fact may cause tension indirectly. In an at-
tempt to remove bias, the DSU requires panelists to decide cases
in their individual capacities. 98 Consequently, the DSU attempts
to ensure that panelists chosen come from countries unrelated to
the countries directly involved in the dispute. The level of success
in ensuring impartiality is questionable because several countries
and delegates have a variety of vested interests.99 Thus, while the
current provisions may lessen the possibility of nationalistic bias,
the DSU has not adequately protected against all potential con-
flicts of interest.100
The issue of bias also arises because panelists are not the final
arbiters of a dispute. Instead, the panelists issue a report which
members may adopt or reject."° ' The members' ability to vote on
the final outcome also raises questions of bias. Due to changes in
95 Id. at 132-33. Confidentiality issues arise within two different contexts. Id. One is the
right of individuals to get information from government about decisions affecting their in-
terests. Id. The other concerns a disputing party's right to obtain information from the
other side in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their opponent's case. Id.
There are quite different policy issues associated with the two. Id. at 132.
96 See DSU supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 132. "Panels shall follow the Working Procedures
appended hereto unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dis-
pute." Id. at 120. It is unclear what tests would be used in making such decisions.
97 See DSU, para. 8.2, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 118.
98 Id. para. 8.9, at 119. Paragraph 8.9 states that panelists shall serve in their individual
capacities and not as government representatives and that "[Miembers shall therefore not
give them instructions nor seek to influence them as individuals in relation to matters
before a panel." Id.
99 For example, a GATT/WTO panel looking at the legality of an export subsidy on pri-
mary produce may decide in a particular way if the panel consists of delegates from coun-
tries which follow such practices.
100 See David M. Schwarz, WTO Dispute Resolution Panels: Failing to Protect Against
Conflicts of Interest, 10 AM. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 955, 969 (1995) (noting that DSU is vulner-
able to conflicts of interest).
101 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 122-23 (discussing adoption of panel reports).
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the procedure for adoption of panel reports, however, the problem
of potential bias may now be lessened. 10 2
Members of the new Appellate Body are not chosen from the
body of government officials. Rather they are chosen from a select
group of multinational and international legal experts, unaffili-
ated with any government or other interested organization. 10 3
Thus, the possibility of national influences affecting the outcome
of their decisions is minimized. Moreover, Paragraph 17.2
strengthens the independence of the decision makers. That para-
graph states that panelists serve a four-year term on the Appel-
late Body, and that each person may be reappointed once." °4 The
limitation of two terms reduces the concern that decision makers
will be influenced by the lure of perpetual reappointment.
These "administrative law" provisions relating to the indepen-
dence of the panel and appellate members are more elaborate
than those contained in the 1989 Improvements. 0 5 Under the ear-
lier provision, panels were only required to be composed of well-
qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals. 0 6
The present authorization of eminent authors and specialists in
international trade law or policy as panel members is further evi-
dence of the drift towards introducing a more legalistic approach
to GATT/WTO dispute settlement.
These examples reflect a move towards both clarity and cer-
tainty in procedure, thus strengthening rule of law principles.
The demand for objective, impartial decision makers, and the op-
portunity for parties to respond fully to matters raised against
them, are fundamental administrative law principles.
102 See id., Part IIIB (relating to adoption of panel reports); see also SCHWARZE supra
note 15, at 983-90 (discussing how to decrease likelihood of bias).
103 See Frances Williams, World Trade News: WTO Names Appeal Judges, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1995, at 8. On November 29, 1995 the WTO Dispute Settlement Body announced
the following appointments to the Appellate Body: Mr. James Bacchus of the United States;
Mr. Christopher Beeby of New Zealand; Professor Claus-Dieter Ehlermann of Germany;
Dr. Said El-Naggar of Eygpt; Justice Florentino of the Phillipines; Mr. Julio Lacarte Muro
of Uruguay; and Professor Mitsuo Matsushita of Japan. Id.
104 DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 123.
105 See id. at 118. "Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the inde-
pendence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experi-
ence." Id.
106 Id. para. 18, at 118.
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B. Standing
To gain access to any reviewing body, one necessarily must meet
the requirement of standing. 10 7 The decision maker must deter-
mine a party's entitlement to present a case. Standing require-
ments apply in both administrative and private law settings. 108 In
administrative law, however, the question is more complicated be-
cause the dispute often concerns government decisions and prac-
tice, with potentially sweeping effects.109 In traditional common
law cases, standing was linked to the remedies available. Now
parties must show a mere "sufficient interest" in the matter. 110
The Australian Courts, for example, may consider whether the de-
cision adversely affected the "person aggrieved." 1 ' In Germany,
the requirement of standing varies according to the remedy." 2 In
the United States, standing requires that the applicant must have
suffered an injury in fact, the injury must have been caused by the
government action, and the court must have the ability to remedy
that injury. 1 13
107 See Craig R. Gottleib, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitu-
tional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1994) (addressing whether
American wildlife biologist who has lived in Sri Lanka has standing to bring suit against
American agencies funding potentially destructive construction projects in Sri Lanka).
Standing is a "preliminary jurisdictional requirement' necessary to establish that a liti-
gant is entitled to judicial action." Id. at 1064; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (proposing new structure to determine standing).
108 See WADE & FoRsvH, supra note 10, at 669 (discussing availability of judicial re-
view); see also Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assoc., 426 U.S. 482,
491-92 (1976) (holding party must have personal or financial stake in decision to bring
cause of action). In administrative law, one may apply for judicial review to the court. At
common law, the Court will decide if a party has standing based on a number of factors. Id.;
Jacobs Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 715 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (Kan.
1989) (holding that to maintain claim of procedural due process under Fourteenth Amend-
ment, party must allege deprivation of property or liberty interest).
109 See Don LeDue, Michigan Administrative Law: Abridged Edition a Michigan Admin-
istrative Law Primer, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 21, 130-31 (1995) (summarizing administra-
tive law in Michigan). "Administrative law standing principles are the same as those in any
other standing case; the difference in administrative cases is the impact of an underlying
statute and the nearly universal involvement of a governing agency in the controversy." Id.
at 130-31.
110 See generally P.P. CR.IG, ADwimTRATrVE LAw 358-64 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing com-
mon law approach to standing).
111 See Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act § 3(4) (1977) (Austr.) (involving
persons whose interests are adversely affected by decision).
112 See MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATvE LAw 120-22 (1985) (discussing
role of standing in German judicial system).
113 See STRAuss, supra note 83, at 225 (discussing test for standing in administrative
law); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (discussing Article III three-
pronged test for standing in private law); Gottleib, supra note 107, at 1070 (discussing
Supreme Court's recently developed three-pronged Article III test).
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The DSU addresses questions of standing. 114 The interests of
disputing parties and of Members of a covered agreement at issue
must be taken into account fully during a panel process." 5 A
third-party Member with a substantial interest in the disputed
matter must announce its interest to the DSB. 1 6 The panel then
grants the third-party Member the opportunity to be heard." 7
Third-party Members have a right to decide unilaterally if they
have a substantial interest in the argument. 11 Thus, the panel
procedure protects both the interests of the parties directly in-
volved in a dispute and the interests of other parties. 119
While this procedure initially appears to be broader than the
standing rules in an administrative law context, it actually is nar-
rower. The procedure encompasses less than joint rights in do-
mestic litigation. While parties can seek to become litigants based
on their substantial interests in the argument, they do not become
parties to the litigation in the traditional common-law sense. 120
Unfortunately, some standing problems remain. As Waincymer
points out, the DSU "provisions work best when there is a direct
bilateral problem, however, many modern trading difficulties
arise when one country impairs another country's export mar-
kets."' 2 ' Waincymer raises the example of Australia's complaints
about American and European export subsidies on agricultural
114 DSU para. 10, supra note 31, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 120. Article 10, entitled "Third
Parties" discusses the right of parties to a dispute, GATT members, and third parties to be
heard.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. para. 10.2, at 120. Paragraph 10.2 provides:
Any member.., having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having
notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a "third party")
shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make any written submis-
sions in the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute
and shall be reflected in the panel report.
Id.
118 See DSU, para. 10.1, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 120. Paragraph 10.1 states that
interests of members of the dispute and members of a covered agreement are to be taken
into account during the dispute process. Id. Annex III states that the panel may hear argu-
ments from parties to the dispute and any invited third party. Id. at 133.
119 Id. art. 10.1, at 120. According to Art. 10.1: "The interests of the parties to the dispute
and those of other Members under a covered agreement at issue in the dispute shall be
fully taken into account during the panel process." Id.
120 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (Foundation Press 1995) (promulgating rule for permissive
joinder of parties); see also Martin E. Silfen, Introduction to New York Civil Practice: 1994,
at 45, 47 (PLI Litig. and Admin. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 513, 1994) (dis-
cussing necessity of indispensability for joinder of parties).
121 MICHAEL PRYLES ET. AL. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 822 (Law Book Co., Info. Serv.
1996).
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products and the adverse effects of those subsidies on Australia's
export performance. 122 Naturally, importing countries happily re-
ceive cheaper, subsidized agricultural products. In this situation
it is "difficult for a country like Australia not directly involved in
the transaction to take an action under the GATT/WTO sys-
tem."123 New provisions in Paragraph 10.2 acknowledge that the
DSB must recognize third party interests. 124 It is unlikely,
though, that the DSB will help an impaired country unless an im-
porting country initiates a panel proceeding.
C. Transparency
In a national context, transparency in administrative law de-
pends upon freedom of information and open government. 125 The
more transparent the process, the more accountable it is to its
members, who in turn, place more confidence in the system.
126
This cascading principle also applies to dispute panels. The more
open the panel's deliberations, the more accountable are its mem-
bers. This openness inspires confidence in the panel's rulings.127
Confidentiality issues, of course, arise within this context. Thus,
many freedom of information statutes exempt from disclosure con-
fidential business information. 128
Traditionally, panels have been criticized for their secrecy. 129
Environmentalists, for example, pressed the Uruguay Round for
122 See id. (discussing effect of American and European subsidies on Australian exports).
123 Id. at 9.
124 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 119. Paragraph 10.2 provides: "[a third party]
shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the
panel." Id.
125 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (governing administrative procedure of disclosure of public
information); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Imagining the Past; Remembering the Future, 1991
DuKE L.J. 711, 727 n.69 (1991) (discussing "administrative openness" and various Freedom
of Information Acts).
126 See STRAuss, supra note 83, at 195. Strauss described open government as "perhaps a
peculiarly American political idea, that publicity can serve as an effective constraint on
government action-that 'sunlight is the best disinfectant.'" Id. at 195. We suggest open-
ness is fundamental to any democratic system of government.
127 See generally David Nimmer, GAT'7s Entertainment: Before and NAFTA, 15 Loy.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 133, 159 (1995). "The goal of the United States in general throughout the
Uruguay Round of GATT renegotiations has been to achieve transparency in national law
schemes." Id.
128 See Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(bXl)-(9)) (1988) (listing and explaining various exemptions from
statute); see also Freedom of Information Act, § 43 (1982) (Austr.) (exempting certain infor-
mation from access under statute).
129 See John H. Jackson, Testimony on the Uruguay Round Legislation, prepared for the
U.S. Senate Finance Committee Hearing, at 6 (Mar. 23, 1994) (on file with authors) [herein-
after Jackson testimony].
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increased transparency in the dispute settlement procedures. 130
Panel secrecy, "is a relic of GATT as an essentially diplomatic fo-
rum. " 13 GATT secrecy bolsters the arguments of critics who are
generally opposed to multilateral dispute settlement and believe
that it is arbitrary and biased. 132
While the DSU has taken a small step towards transparency,
panels still meet in closed session.1 33 Parties to the dispute or
other interested parties can attend meetings only by invitation. 3 4
The DSU protects from public disclosure confidential business in-
formation presented to panels. This is consistent with adminis-
trative law principles in the Freedom of Information ("FOI") legis-
lation.1 35 The DSU provisions could be narrowed, permitting the
process and presentation of material to be open, subject to the ex-
emption of confidential state or business material. 136 Of course,
national governments could disclose the arguments they make
before a dispute panel.'3 7 Even so, there is still room for greater
openness and transparency if the enhancement of administrative
and rule of law principles are to be consistent with other develop-
ments in the DSU.
130 See Steven M. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions to Improve Global En-
vironmental Relations, Agreement, and Treaty Enforcement, 18 HASTrNGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 771, 818 (1995) (discussing desire for "positive change" for international environmen-
tal law as it would ensure a system with transparency and frequent operational reviews);
see also Jennifer Schultz, The GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment-
Toward Environmental Reform, 89 Am. J. INTL L. 423, 431 (1995). "A major concern of
environmentalists regarding the Uruguay Round was the need for increased transparency
and improved procedures for dispute settlement involving trade and environmental con-
flicts." Id.
131 See David Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Disputes: Defining GATT's Role in an Era of Increasing Conflict, 24 LAw & POL'Y.
INT'L Bus. 1145, 1160 (1993) (describing old GATT procedure).
132 See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. S1110-01 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1992) (statement of Sen. Bent-
sen) (maintaining that text of DSU was only strong enough to serve as framework for trade
disputes).
133 See DSU para. 14, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 122. Paragraph 14, entitled "Confiden-
tiality" provides "panel deliberations shall be confidential. Id.
134 See id. para. 15, at 122. Paragraph 15, entitled "Interim Review Stage" permits meet-
ings with the panel at the request of the parties. Id.
135 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994) (providing each agency shall make public records
available).
136 Accord 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (setting forth predisclosure notification procedures for confi-
dential commercial information ); see also Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. v. Mathews, 415 F.
Supp. 78, 81 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that, under Freedom of Information Act, agency may
refuse to produce opinions, advice evaluations, deliberations, policy formations, proposals,
conclusions, or recommendations).
137 See DSU app. 3, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 132 (providing nothing in DSU prohibits
parties to dispute from disclosing statements of its own to public).
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D. Timeliness and Finality-but no Reference to Exhaustion
Administrative law principles of timeliness and finality also are
raised within domestic national contexts. Persons affected by gov-
ernment decisions may seek a variety of avenues of relief,13 par-
ticularly when judicial review is available to affected parties. 139 In
the United States, a party must exhaust available administrative
remedies prior to seeking judicial review. The administrative ac-
tions must be final and the conflict must be ripe for review.' 40
Such exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures the proper
allocation of resources between agencies and courts without un-
necessary interruption to the agency process.' 4' In Common-
wealth common-law systems, principles of exhaustion are often
provided at the decision maker's discretion. 42
The GATT/WTO procedures also raise issues of timeliness and
finality. 43 The international context, however, somewhat compli-
cates matters. Disputes between nationals and their govern-
ments14 4 and disputes between countries involve different issues.
In relation to the latter, the principle of exhaustion is inapplica-
ble. Previously, exhaustion of administrative and judicial reme-
dies at the national level was not a condition for recourse to the
international GATT dispute settlement system. The GATT/WTO
Agreement maintains that position. 45 This inconsistency is logi-
138 See, e.g., DAVID FouLKEs, INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 191 (1968) (discuss-
ing methods of remedies available in administrative law). For example, "a remedy may be
sought in the courts, in other [cases] before tribunals, in another by means of an appeal...
to a higher official." Id.
139 See, e.g., WADE AND FORSYTH, supra note 10, at 669 (discussing scope of judicial re-
view). Various remedies are "interchangeable under a unified system of procedure, the 'ap-
plication for judicial review.'"Id.
140 See, e.g., STRAuss, supra note 83, at 229 (discussing requirements for standing in
administrative law).
141 See id. at 229 (discussing necessity of exhausting administrative remedies).
142 See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 10, at 357 (discussing parliamentary exhaustion
principles).
143 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (The GATT Antidumping Code), I.E.L. I-B-2 (1989) (discussing rules governing
imposition of antidumping duties); see also Timothy M. Reif, Coming of Age in Geneva:
Guiding the GATT Dispute Settlement System on Review of Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Proceedings, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1185, 1196 (1993) (discussing finality
in GATT Antidumping Code).
144 See GATT Antidumping Code, supra note 143, at I-B-2; see also Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (requiring complainants to do all they can in their own countries
before going to International Committee on Human Rights).
145 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 115-17 (expressing desire for prompt settlement
of disputes and calling on members to exercise judgment as to whether DSU action would
be fruitful).
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cal considering that domestic remedies often deal with the rights
of individuals, while the GATT/WTO system deals with disputes
between nation states. 146 In practice, most domestic courts tend to
ignore the issue of GATT consistency in relation to national meas-
ures.14 v GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures are designed
to protect the rights and obligations of governments. Legal reme-
dies are not sought to repair or to compensate injury. It would
seem, therefore, that exhaustion of administrative and judicial
remedies is not necessary. 148
E. Merits /Judicial Review-the New Appellate System
One of the most striking features of the WTO dispute settle-
ment system is the creation of the appellate review body. 149 Com-
bined, the panel process and the provisions for appellate review
create a strong adjudicative system within the GATT/WTO. 1 50
The appellate body conducts a legal review of panel decisions. Ar-
ticle 17 of the DSU provides that the Appellate Body is to be a
standing organ, comprised of seven persons appointed by the DSB
for staggered four-year terms.' Three members, selected on rota-
146 See Scott H. Segal and Stephen J. Orava, Playing the Zone and Controlling the
Board: The Emerging Jurisdictional Consensus and the Court of International Trade, 44
AM. U. L. REv. 2393, 2395 (1995) (discussing major concern and controversy surrounding
GATT process regarding adjudication of disputes among nations); see also Helene Cooper &
John Harwood, Major Shifts in Trade are Ensured as Gatt Wins U.S. Approval, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A12 (arguing numerous safeguards in society will be undermined if
trade dispute settlement is ceded to WTO without any United States veto power
protection).
147 See Petersmann, supra note 54, at 1240 (arguing GATT' contracting parties do not
want to hold dispute settlement proceedings hostage to completion of national administra-
tive and judicial proceedings).
148 See generally Strauss, supra note 83, at 79 (addressing interplay of judicial and ad-
ministrative systems). There is a practical issue as to whether any real nullification and
impairment could exist under Article XXIII of the GATT, when the relevant individuals
may still have a right to full redress in a domestic system. One instance in which these
issues could be relevant is when a dispute is brought at the GATT/WTO level in the an-
tidumping area concerning an interim measure where appropriate domestic remedies have
not been utilized.
149 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the
New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 483 (1994) (describing creation of new appellate body as
"the most drastic innovation in GATT dispute settlement"); see also Bal Gopal Das, Intellec-
tual Property Dispute, GAT, WIPO: Of Playing by the Game Rules and Rules of the Game,
35 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 149, 169 (1994) (discussing DSU's fundamental innovation in devel-
oping appellate review).
150 See generally Dillon, supra note 37, at 375-76 (1995) (discussing four phases of new
GATT dispute settlement process, including consultation, final phase, Appellate Body Re-
view, and optional arbitration).
151 See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 149, at 483-84 (discussing Paragraph 17 and appel-
late review process).
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tion without reference to nationality or the wishes of the parties,
hear each case.1 - 2 As a general rule, the time from the date of noti-
fication of the appeal until circulation of the appellate report
should not exceed sixty days.1 53 The DSB adopts and uncondition-
ally accepts the Appellate Body's report unless, within thirty days
of its circulation to Members, the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt it.' 55
The appellate mechanism is designed to ensure the correct ap-
plication of WTO law. 155 One potential problem exists in that this
mechanism likely will encourage regular appeals, and therefore
may weaken panel prestige and authority. 5 ' In particular, a los-
ing government may face political pressure to appeal a negative
panel finding, even if only to delay the implementation of that
finding.' 57
This system also raises some fundamental administrative law
issues concerning the scope of review to be undertaken by both the
panel and the appellate body. The notion of appellate review on
the law is the equivalent of judicial review within national admin-
istrative law systems. For instance, if an administrative decision
152 See DSU art. 8, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 119 (parenthetical).
153 See id. at 117. According to Paragraph 4.7, a panel may be requested if dispute can-
not be settled in sixty days. Id.
When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 30 days, it
shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate
of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings
exceed 60 days.
Id.
154 See id. at 123. Paragraph 16.4 states that a panel report will be adopted within sixty
days "unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decisions to
appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report." Id.
155 See, e.g., Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present Sit-
uation and Its Prospects, 10 J. INT'L Aaa. 27 (1993) (outlining general framework of GATT
dispute settlement process and changes effected by the Uruguay Rounds).
156 But see Taunya McLarty, GATT 1994 Dispute Settlement: Sacrificing Diplomacy for
Efficiency in the Multilateral Trading System, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 241, 270-71 (1994) (sug-
gesting appeals will not detract from but will increase respect for panel since reasons for
appeals will vary).
157 See William M. Reichert, Resolving the Trade and Environment Conflict: The WTO
and NGO Consultive Relations, 5 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 225 (1996). This is due in
part to the fact that governments can no longer block the adoption of panel decisions. Id.
"Under the original GATT system, any member state could block an adverse panel ruling
... [but] [u]nder the WTO, however, panel reports are automatically adopted and it takes a
negative consensus to choose not to adopt a panel report." Id.; see also Claudio Cocuzza &
Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing Their Sovereign Rights? The GATT Dispute
Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TuL. J. INT. & CoMP. L. 161, 179 (1996)(suggesting that many unwarranted appeals, systematically used to delay report, could
paralyze Appellate Body); Mora, supra note 7, at 151 (noting excessive numbers of appeals
will require Appellate Body to develop procedures for disposing of frivolous appeals).
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is made, any review by the Court is limited to the "lawfulness" of
the decision and does not address "merits."l5 8 In Commonwealth
common-law countries there is a distinction between merits re-
view and judicial review. 159 Merits-review bodies, such as internal
agency review160 or external agency review, 16 1 examine the origi-
nal decision on the merits or de novo. The review body becomes
the decision maker of a matter already decided by the administra-
tive agency. 16
2
It could be argued that, in the GATT/WTO context, the dispute
panel parallels the external review body. The dispute panel re-
views the decision de novo even though the dispute between the
countries may not have been heard in a national forum. Once the
panel decision is made, the only avenue that the complainant can
pursue, is a review on the law.163 If this analogy is correct, then
the appeal body could only decide if the panel erred in law.
Article 17.6 of the DSU provides that the appellate body's scope
of review "shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel
report and legal interpretation developed by the panel."164 This
raises the perennial issue of what constitutes a question of law
and what constitutes a question of fact.165 It also begs the ques-
tion whether appellate body members from around the world can
agree on this distinction. Article 17.13 states: "[The] Appellate
Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclu-
sions of the panel."'66 As Petersmann argues, "[t]his language
seems broad enough to enable the Appellate Body to specify the
number of legal issues not explicitly addressed in Article 17, such
as... lack of competence of a panel, breach of procedure before a
158 See generally MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE 214,
218-19 (1993) (discussing standards of federal appellate review in civil and criminal cases).
159 See, e.g., ALLARs, supra note 10, at 162-63 (discussing natural justice in common-
wealth common law countries).
160 See, e.g., William Anderson, The 1988 Washington Administrative Procedure Act - An
Introduction, 64 WASH. L. REV. 781, 815-17 (1989) (discussing internal agency review as
performed by Administrative Law Judges).
161 See DSU art. 17.6, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 118 (describing generally review by
dispute panel).
162 See, e.g., CHERYL SAUNDERS, APPEAL OR REVIEW: THE EXPERIENCE OF ADMINISTRATWVE
APPEAL N AUSTRALA (on file with authors) (1993) (explaining merits review system in
Australia).
163 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 123 (stating in paragraph 17.6, "[aln appeal
shall be limited to issues of law").
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., TIGAR, supra note 158, at 212 (contrasting questions of law and questions of
fact).
166 See DSU art. 17.13, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 123.
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panel which adversely affects the panel findings, and incorrect ap-
plication of WTO law .... ,167 Thus, the panel's decision is broader
in scope than the appellate body's decision, for the panel looks into
the merits or facts of the case under review.
The breadth of judicial review within national domestic systems
also is not clear. In common-law systems, a long-standing juris-
prudential debate exists regarding the scope of judicial review.16
Notions of "proportionality" and "unreasonableness" in Common-
wealth law suggest that the review can be very broad indeed.
169
In the United States, Section 706 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act sets out the general framework for judicial review of
agency action. 170 Different standards of review exist within this
section. 171 The "hard look doctrine" reflects an aggressive method
of judicial review.172 By contrast, the "Chevron doctrine" 173 essen-
tially states that where a particular statute is not "clear on its
face," the courts, rather than substitute their own interpretation,
will defer to the judgment of an agency implicitly designated by
the legislature if that agency has interpreted the statute in a rea-
sonable manner. 174
167 Petersmann, supra note 54, at 1217.
168 See Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969) (addressing issue of court re-
view of case de novo at appellate level).
169 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corp., 1 KB 223
(1948) (expressing classic test for reasonableness); see also 0. HOOD PHmLrPS, CONSTrru-
TIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 669 (7th Ed. 1987) (observing that court's tendency to
broaden scope of judicial review fosters review on grounds of "unreasonableness").
170 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1982) (hereinafter APA).
The APA created an "arbitrary, capricious, . . . abuse of discretion' standard that courts
may use to review actions of government agencies". Id.; see also Samuel Estreicher & Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 759
(1989) (discussing application of standard of review of APA). See generally Marshall J. Bre-
ger, Review of an Introduction to Administrative in the United States by Peter L. Strauss, 60
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 268, 272-75 (1991) (discussing procedural options for rulemaking avail-
able to agencies).
171 See Strauss, supra note 83, at 243-44 (discussing section 706(2) of APA and three
different standards of review for conclusions of fact made by agency).
172 See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (announcing court's duty to broadly intervene if governmental agency has failed to
take "a 'hard look' at salient problems and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making"). See generally R. CAss AND C. DIVER, ADMNsTRATrvE LAw CASES AND MATERILS
141-80 (1987) (discussing particular aspects of judicial review: standards applied through
scope, timing of review and availability to specific parties).
173 See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (hold-
ing courts must address two questions when interpreting statutes: (1) whether Congress
has addressed issue in question, and (2) whether an agency's interpretation was permissi-
ble based on construction of statute).
174 See id. at 844 (giving deference to interpretations of administrative agencies).
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F. Deference Issue - Principles of Interpretation
The responses to "deference" in the GATT context are mixed.
Should panel decision makers defer to a national body, or national
interpretation of the GATT, following a provincial determina-
tion? 7 5 The notion of "deference" within the GATT/WT O frame-
work is now further explained in the context of GATT/WTO re-
views of anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations.
The nature of the jurisprudence that guides the GATT/WTO dis-
pute settlement system guides the scope of its judicial review. The
panel reviews national administrative law principles which are
derived from the GATT/WTO. In the past, GATT dispute settle-
ment practice 176 applied a de novo standard of legal review of the
national measures. It is an established principle of interpretation
in international law, however, that a de novo review substituting
an international interpretation for that of a national agency, may
not always be appropriate. 177 For example, if the national agency
enjoys regulatory discretion and exercises that discretion in a rea-
sonable manner without abuse, arbitrariness or manifest error,
the panel will not disturb the agency's ruling.17 8 Whether such
GATT/WTO deference to the national agency's decision is war-
ranted depends upon the rule concerned.
Anti-dumping and countervailing proceedings reveal this inher-
ent conflict. 179 The standard of review for anti-dumping is set out
175 See JACKSON, supra note 27, at 330 (suggesting that issue of deference is one of more
difficult problems faced in recent years by GAT1T dispute settlement system).
176 See DSU art. 3.1, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M at 115. Article 3.1. states that past GATT
dispute settlement practice shall also serve as a guide for the new dispute settlement pro-
cess. Id.
177 See Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: Extraordinary Challenge Commit-
tee Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Binational Panel Remand Decision II-In
the Matter of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork From Canada, 30 I.L.M. 1151, 1163 (1991)
(finding that Extraordinary Challenge Committee, appellate body, erred in considering ex-
tra evidence in its review); see also United States: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decision in Helen Liu v. The Republic of China (Act of State Doctrine; Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 29 I.L.M. 192, 196 (1989) (holding that while de novo review by an appel-
late body is normally inappropriate, de novo review of subject matter jurisdiction is
exception).
178 See Reif, supra note 143, at 1190-91 (proposing two-prong standard of review which
upholds that task of panels as described by GATT is limited to conducting review of author-
ity's decision).
179 See Charles M. Gastle & Jean G. Castel, Q.C., Should the North American Free Trade
Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
be Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lumber III?, 26 LAW & POL'Y IN'L Bus. 823, 824-25
(1995) (discussing issue regarding degree of deference reviewing panels accord administra-
tive agencies); see also Reif, supra note 143, at 1186-90 (exemplifying conflict between for-
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in Article 17:6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 180 The standard of
review of the GATT/WTO consistency of anti-dumping measures
rests on the assumption that the application of the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law may lead to
more than one permissible interpretation. In such cases, the
choice among permissible interpretations should lie with the de-
fendant country rather than with the DSB. However, this as-
sumption of legitimacy of diverging national interpretations con-
flicts with the declared objective of the WTO dispute settlement
procedures. The aim of the DSU is to clarify the existing provi-
sions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.' 8 ' Based on the word-
ing of Article 17:6(ii), the degree of GATT/WTO deference to na-
tional decisions is difficult to determine.18 2
GATT/WTO panels do not receive the same degree of deference
from the appeal body as national agencies receive from courts.
Perhaps, then, they should be freed from the constraints ordina-
rily applied in judicial dispute settlement. 8 3 A dispute-settlement
process that frees GATT/WTO panels from the traditional
eign antidumping and countervailing duty determination and international obligations
which United States vigilantly challenges).
180 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI [hereinafter the Antidumping
Agreement], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec.15, 1993), 33 ILM 1, 1-12 (1994) (providing full text
of Antidumping Agreement).
181 See DSU para. 3.2, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 114 (noting DSU serves to preserve
rights and obligations of members under covered agreements and public international law).
182 See DSU art. 17.6, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 123. Paragraph 17.6 provides: "an
appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretation
developed by the panel." Id.; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 330. The authors
state "it remains to be seen whether this provision will limit the way in which panels ap-
proach antidumping cases." There are certainly important issues in identifying the reason
why there is a special standard of review in the antidumping area, and the extent to which
the WTO was permitted to encroach on domestic interpretation and administrative princi-
ples. Furthermore among the ministerial declarations adopted at the end of the Uruguay
Round there was one that stated that the Antidumping standard of review will be reviewed
after a period of three years with a view to considering the question of whether it is capable
of general application. This raises the issue of whether the WTO is really seeking to ensure
a harmonized process of administration and administrative review among its member
states. The authors intend to examine these issues in greater depth in forthcoming articles.
Id.
183 See Palmeter & Spak, supra note 131, at 1156-60. Palmeter and Spak reject the posi-
tion that dispute resolution panels should be restrained by principles of deference or ex-
haustion. Id. The analogy between dispute resolution under the GATT and resolution of
questions of U.S. administrative law is not a strong foundation for imposing any con-
straints on GATr panels charged with interpreting an international agreement. Id. Be-
cause national agencies are not GATT experts, it is possible to argue that GATT panels
ought not defer to national interpretations of the GATT' Anti-dumping or Subsidies Code.
Id.
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precepts of treaty interpretation essentially allows panelists to fill
the gaps in an international agreement. This is a radical depar-
ture from the accepted principles of international law. The DSU
supports this view of the scope of review.' 8 4 The DSU states that
"recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or dimin-
ish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agree-
ment."8 5 This provision reflects the view of many trade policy
makers that international trading rights and obligations should
only be created, modified, or diminished through negotiations and
not through judicial interpretation.
Are the dispute panel and appellate body responsible for inter-
preting law in a manner that will be determinative of the law?
The DSU appears to suggest that they are not. Yet, taken as a
whole, this approach nonetheless displays a move towards the
rule of law, with the panels and appeal bodies responsible for pro-
moting a singular interpretation of GATT law. This shift towards
utilization of public international law also is recognized in the
DSU. 186 It states that the dispute settlement system of the WTO
is to "clarify the existing provisions" under the Covered Agree-
ments "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law."' 87
Underlying the problems of interpretation is the issue of the
sovereignty of states.18  Since international law recognizes the ul-
timate sovereign authority of states, conflicts arise when two or
more sovereign states interpret their obligations differently.' 8 9
184 See Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph
Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw. 389, 399-00 (1995) (contrasting Tokyo Round dispute resolu-
tion mechanism to expanded scope of GATT dispute resolution process).
185 DSU art. 3.2, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 115.
186 Id. (noting DSU seeks to clarify exiting provisions in accordance with "customary
rules of interpretation of public international law").
187 Id..
188 See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the
World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 127-28 (1995) (criticizing the
Tokyo Round technique which resulted in varied national participation in agreements).
The issue of interference with sovereignty is even more significant after the Uruguay
Round because of the "take it or leave it" style of the package. Id. at 134. Countries who
accepted the GATT/WTO accepted the entire package. Id. The previous system of "GATT a
la carte" no longer exists. Id.
189 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 849, 851 (1992) ("[r]ecalling ... that States have, in
accordance with... the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources"); see also Council of Europe: Framework Convention For the Protection of
National Minorities, 34 I.L.M. 351, 357 (1995) (finding that Framework Convention, Sec-
tion III, article 21, will not perform contrary "to the fundamental principles of international
law and in particular of the sovereign... independence of States").
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Traditionally, the GATT dispute process avoided this tension by
retaining the sovereign authority of states to interpret their GATT
obligations. 9 ° The panel examined the issues, reviewed relevant
documents, and offered its interpretation in the form of its re-
port. 191 A consensus of the GATT Council was needed before adop-
tion of a panel report.192 The binding nature of the Panel decision
as between the parties was not supplied by the Panel but was ad-
dressed in the agreement of the Contracting Parties. 193 In the cur-
rent GATT/WTO, panel reports are automatically binding on the
parties unless there is a consensus not to adopt them. 4 This au-
tomatic adoption could represent an infringement of the disputing
parties' national sovereignty. At the same time, however, auto-
matic adoption reinforces the notion of the GATT/WTO moving to-
ward a "rule of law," where all parties are subject to the same
rules. 19
5
Given the mixed messages of the DSU about the scope of review,
interpretation of the breadth of review will be left to the decision
makers of the panels and the appellate bodies. This may depend,
therefore, on the decision maker in any given case. It is our view
that the move towards a rule of law in the new dispute framework
demands minimal deference to the original decision maker. 196
V. REMEDIES
Remedies under the GATT/WTO are understandably weak.1 97
Like most other international agreements, neither the GATT nor
the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement define the legal liabilities of a
190 See Demaret, supra note 188, at 127-34 (discussing GATT approach prior to Uruguay
Round).
191 See id. at 126-131 (discussing evolution of GATT from 1947-1994).
192 See Chen, supra note 67, at 1330 (discussing abandonment of consensus approach to
adoption of panel reports).
193 See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 330. One issue which has continually arisen is
whether the contracting parties in adopting a report in fact ever adopt a particular inter-
pretation or merely adopt the report vis-a-vis a particular dispute between two parties.
This is because there is no doctrine of precedent in international law. GATT panels, never-
theless, try to maintain judicial consistency.
194 See DSU, supra note 31, 113 I.L.M. at 123 (addressing adoption of panel reports).
195 See WADE AND FORSYrH, supra note 10, at 23. While "rule of law has a number of
different meanings.. . [ilts primary meaning is that everything must be done according to
the law." Id.
196 See Reif, supra note 143, at 580-81. (arguing that specific GATT disputes demand
more deference than others).
197 See Young, supra note 184, at 404 (discussing new enforcement provisions which in-
clude procedures and rules which will encourage implementation of and adherence to panel
recommendations).
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contracting party that has violated its obligations. 198 The new
DSU indicates that the preferred solution is one mutually accepta-
ble to the disputing parties. 199 Thereafter, the first objective is
usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures that are incon-
sistent with the agreements.2 00 This withdrawal parallels the gen-
eral international law obligations to perform international trea-
ties in good faith, to withdraw any illegal measures, and to
eliminate all the consequences of the illegal act. The standard rec-
ommendation of panel reports is to request that the defaulting
country conform its activities to GATT/WTO.2 ° '
Regarding compensation, Article 22.1 codifies two principles of
GATT/WTO dispute settlement practice. First, compensation
should only result if immediate withdrawal is impractical.2 °2 Sec-
ond, compensation must be voluntary.20 3 Proposals to introduce
into the GATT/WTO system an obligation to grant monetary or
other compensation were discussed and rejected in 1966 and,
198 See DSU, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 116 (describing determination of injury and
failing to say how party not in compliance with panel reports will be dealt with, as was case
in Tokyo Round Agreement). The DSU recognized that "the first objective of the dispute
settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if
these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.
The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of
the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the
measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement." Id. at 115; see also Young, supra
note 184, at 404 (outlining other potential results from noncompliance with panel
recommendations).
199 See DSU para. 3.7, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 115.
200 See id. para. 21.5, at 126 (instructing parties to resort to dispute settlement proce-
dures when faced with measures inconsistent with covered agreement).
201 See id. para. 22.1 (noting neither compensation nor suspension of concessions is pref-
erable to full implementation of recommendation).
202 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes;
Annex 2, GATT Doc. WL'761484 (1994) It is recognized that in GATT dispute settlement
practice:
[Tlhe first objective of the Contracting Parties is usually to secure the withdrawal of
the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the General Agree-
ment. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate with-
drawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the with-
drawal of the measures which are inconsistent with the General Agreement.
Id.
203 See ECC Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples from Chile, Report of the Panel
adopted on 22 June 1989, in B.I.S.D. 36 S/93, 134-35. In the Chilean apple case, the GATT
panel noted that there was no provision in the General Agreement obliging contracting
parties to provide compensation and rejected a request by Chile that the panel recommend
that the EEC accord compensatory trade benefits to Chile. Id.; see also Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, Panel Decision Adopted 11 July 1996, GATT Doc WI406720 (1996)(noting limited precedent effect of panel reports as described in Chile Apple case).
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again, during the Uruguay Round negotiations.2 °4 As a last resort,
the complaining party may request authorization from the DSB to
authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations on a dis-
criminatory basis vis-a-vis the other Member.20 5
The parallels with administrative law remedies are evident
since the DSU restricts the courts' ability to review administrative
decisions. In Commonwealth common-law countries, an appellate
court cannot reverse and then decide; it can only direct the origi-
nal decision maker to re-decide "according to law."20 6 The remedy
often is a "declaration" which states the legal position between the
parties, and then the parties must act.207 Once again, administra-
tive law principles appear to be influencing the GATT/WTO DSB
options. Remedies within the understanding are, in essence, simi-
lar to a Court declaration. In the GATT/WTO context, whether
the parties will follow the principles set forth depends on the polit-
ical factors involved. Remedies, therefore, highlight the strong in-
termeshing of rule of law principles and political realities.
CONCLUSION
The new DSU is promoting a rule-orientated system for the set-
tlement of international trade disputes. This illustrates a move
toward a "rule of law" in the GATT/WTO context and strengthens
the development of an international rule of law.20 8 "The Agree-
204 See Compensation in the Context of the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Proce-
dures, Uruguay Round note by the GATr Secretariat (MTN.GNCING13/W/32 of 14 July
1989) (rejecting proposal of compensation in resolution of disputes).
205 See DSU art. 22.2, supra note 31, 33 I.L.M. at 126 (authorizing DSB's suspension of
concessions if member fails to bring inconsistent measure into compliance with covered
agreement within reasonable time).
206 See Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act, § 16 (1977) (Austl.) (referring de-
cision back to decision maker).
207 See FouLKEs, supra note 138, at 137. A declaration "declares what the legal rights of
the party to the action are and has no coercive force." Id.; see also WADE AND FORS ,
supra note 10, at 593 (addressing effect of declarations).
208 See James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531, 569 (1993) (noting
recognized standards of international law by international bodies such as International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). The International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the GATI/WTO dispute settlement system, the World Bank's International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA) promote rule orientated legal methods for the settlement of international
economic disputes. Id.; see also Donald Dowling Jr., Forum Shopping and Other Reflections
on Litigation Involving U.S. and European Businesses, 7 PACE INT'L L. REv. 465, 479 (1995)
(discussing forum selection within Europe). In Western Europe, the European Community
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights also add to this strengthening of
an international rule of law. Id.
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ment Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) ... is not
only the longest agreement ever concluded (comprising some
26,000 pages), but is also the most important worldwide agree-
ment since the UN Charter of 1945."209 The WTO Agreement es-
sentially integrates international regulation of trans-national
movements of goods, services, persons, and investments. It sets
out a new legal code of conduct for over 100 countries and lays the
legal foundation for international economic activity for decades to
come. As such, the Agreement has a substantial bearing on na-
tional sovereignty and control.
The economic, political, and legal advantages of this progressive
move toward rule orientation and legal methods in the WTO dis-
pute settlement system are numerous. 210 As Professor Jackson
notes, the importance of a rule-orientated system can be quite eas-
ily established-indeed, all successful domestic economic systems
rely very heavily on a rule oriented system.211
Panel reports and dispute settlement rulings may develop con-
sistent case law, accepted interpretations, and new rules. De-
pending upon the approach of the decision makers to the issue of
"deference," gaps will possibly be filled in the existing treaty.
These changes may transform the GATT/WTO into a more consis-
tent and comprehensive legal system. One counter argument that
could be raised against a more rule-based approach is that the
new system will potentially allow the dispute settlement process
to develop new interpretations or quasi-common law which may in
fact in the short term reduce predictability and reduce confidence
in the system by some members at least. In the long term, how-
ever, the system should become more predictable and certain.
This does not separate the GATT/WTO framework from its polit-
209 Petersmann, supra note 39, at 1160.
210 See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 1211-16. Professor Jackson provides a detailed
analysis of the costs and benefits of legal procedures in relation to the United States. Id. He
also outlines the arguments for and against a legalistic system as it applies to United
States trade and notes the dilemma of a legalistic system. Id.
The dilemma is that the more one maximizes the goals of a legalistic system (predict-
ability, transparency, and elimination of corruption and political back-room deals), the
more one sacrifices other desirable goals such as flexibility and the ability of govern-
ment officials to make determinations in the broad national interest as opposed to ca-
tering to specific special interests.
Id. at 1215-25.
211 See id. at 1232. Professor Jackson also notes that at the domestic level a rule oriented
system is easier to obtain because national sovereign governments have a certain monopoly
on power, whereas at the international level there is no such monopoly, and as such it is
more difficult to establish an effective and efficient rule orientated system. Id.
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ical context. On the contrary, the dispute settlement processes
still include the conciliation and negotiation planks, but these
planks are now defined by clear principles and processes.
In addition, the clear movement toward administrative law
principles of due process/natural justice, broader standing, more
transparency, and an appeal mechanism which emphasizes some
form of judicial review, all point toward a stronger system for
resolving international disputes. Now, if the political/conciliatory
stage2 12 of GATT/WTO dispute settlement fails, a strengthened
legal system with clear processes, rules, time frames, and princi-
ples remains. A move towards a rule of law within the GATT/
WTO can only become clearer as these processes are called upon
in forthcoming disputes.213
A rule-orientated, rather than a power-orientated, interpreta-
tion and application of the GATT/WTO enhances predictability
and legal security and limits the risk of abuses of power. This
change ultimately reduces the transaction costs of traders and
producers and thereby promotes business certainty. A rule-orien-
tated approach to GATT/WTO dispute settlement and enforce-
ment is also likely to promote confidence in the overall multilat-
eral trading system by making the GATT/WTO a more credible
and effective system.
212 See 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27 (July 5, 1995). The United States-Japan auto
trade dispute which was resolved by June 28, 1995 is an example of the political/diplomatic
stage. Id. In this dispute Japan and the United States agreed to compromise on a range of
issues. Id. Threatened sanctions were dropped as were the WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings. Id.; see also Japan Will Deregulate Auto Parts, Official Says, WALL ST. J., June
28, 1995, at A8 (noting Japanese plans to deregulate its aftermarket for auto parts regard-
less of outcome of auto-trade discussions with United States); Bob Davis, U.S. Expects
Goals in Pact With Japan to be Met Even Without Overt Backing, WALL ST. J., June 30,
1995, at A3 (expressing United States optimism that Japan would "endorse" United States
estimates of future purchases of United States made carparts even though Japanese gov-
ernment refused to back American goals for auto trade).
213 See Schultz, supra note 70 (discussing U.S. gasoline dispute).
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